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GENDER INEQUALITY IN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION: CONTROLLING WOMEN'S
REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
Melissa E. Fraserf
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note1 attempts to add to those voices currently critiquing
the new reproductive technologies by suggesting a two-step analysis
which (1) analyzes how a specific reproductive technology can cre-
ate inequitable power structures for women who turn to it, and (2)
places that reproductive technology within a larger pattern of con-
trolling all women's reproductive autonomy. While step one may
be a familiar one to writers critiquing reproductive technologies,
step two-taking the analysis, placing it as part of a larger pattern
of control, and then reevaluating the analysis-may be a newer but
necessary approach. Placing the reproductive technology within a
larger pattern of control is necessary since simply critiquing the
inequality within a reproductive technique cannot provide a full
picture of the extent and type of control exhibited over women's
reproductive autonomy. It also cannot provide the opportunity to
investigate how the analysis itself changes once one steps back from
the specific focus-a single reproductive technology-and views a
larger entity-all women's reproductive autonomy.
This Note will apply this two-part analysis to the specific repro-
ductive technology of in vitro fertilization (IVF). VF is the pro-
cess whereby a woman's egg is fertilized with sperm in a petri dish
and then returned to the woman's uterus for development and de-
livery.2 This Note argues that IVF has not received the close scru-
tiny necessary to prevent its potential misuse against the women
turning to the technology. This Note will analyze the power struc-
ture within IVF by looking at the power relations between the wo-
men and the technology, the women and the doctors, and the
phenomena of informed consent.
The question will then be asked: "Who is missing from IVF
t Candidate forJ.D., 1998, The City University of New York School of Law; MA.,
1995, The George Washington University; B.A, 1993, Vanderbilt University.
I The original version of this Note was written to satisfy the thesis requirement for
the Master of Arts degree at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
2 Tanya Feliciano, Note, Davis v. Davis: Wat About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L.
REv. 305, 307-08 (1993).
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participation and why?" Research from a variety of areas suggests
that IVF is employed by a relatively select subgroup of women in
the United States (white, middle-/upper-class, heterosexual
couples). While having a technology that is used only by selected
women suggests inequality, questioning why this occurs will shed
light on how reproductive technologies can be used to impact on
all women's reproductive autonomy.
Part two of the analysis places the inequality within IVF into
the larger pattern of societal control over women's reproductive
autonomy. There are many ways this can be accomplished. This
Note argues that control over women's reproductive autonomy is
demonstrated by the selective valorization of some women's repro-
ductivity and the selective devalorization of other women's repro-
ductivity. By viewing IVF alongside such reproductive controls as
forced sterilization, Norplant®3 use as a condition of probation,
and fetal abuse laws, a larger pattern becomes clear which may not
be seen when each phenomenon is viewed individually. Some wo-
men are being pushed toward reproduction as a result of the re-
productive options available to them while other women are
pushed away from reproduction as a result of the choices open to
them.
Using an analysis which questions not only the inequality
within the reproductive technology but also the inequality in the
application of all reproductive technologies allows for the identifi-
cation of larger patterns of control not visible through an individ-
ual analysis approach. It is only through this questioning of the
development and use of reproductive technologies that women
can gain control over the technologies and truly use them on their
own terms and for the benefit of all women.
II. IVF: A MEDICAL TECHNIQUE
The first baby conceived through the use of IVF was born in
England in 1978.' The first baby born in the United States
through the use of IVF came three years later in Virginia.5 These
births, however, followed years of medical development, including
a 1973 procedure in which an egg was fertilized in vitro, allowed to
3 The Norplant System® is marketed in the United States by Wyeth-Ayerst Labo-
ratories, Inc. of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. PHYSiCANs' DESK REFERENCE 3085 (1998)
[hereinafter, Norplant].
4 George J. Annas & Sherman Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer:
Medicolegal Aspects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 202 (1983).
5 Id.
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develop to the several-cell stage, and then transferred to a patient
who underwent a hysterectomy two days later.6 By the mid-1980s,
many no longer considered IVF an experimental procedure, and as
of 1993 an estimated 700 IVF programs in over fifty-three countries
were in operation.
7
An IVF treatment, or cycle, can be divided into three phases:
egg retrieval, fertilization and implantation, and storage.
A. Egg Retrieval
As part of the retrieval phase, clients are given a series of psy-
chological and physical tests to screen and prepare for the proce-
dure. Once screened, the woman is usually given drugs to produce
superovulation (production of multiple eggs during one cycle).'
The procedure is monitored daily through blood hormonal assays
and ultrasounds in order to track the quality and quantity of devel-
oping eggs.9 Once the maximum achievement point is reached,
human chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) is given to the woman to
achieve final maturation of the eggs.'0
Thirty-four hours after the use of hCG, the eggs are gathered
either through the use of a laparoscopy or a transvaginal ultra-
sound." The 1992 IVF-ET Registry published by the Society for
Assisted Reproductive Technologies (SART) reported that 85% of
IVF stimulations (24,996 out of 29,404 cycles) lead to an egg
retrieval. 12
6 Melvin G. Dodson et al., A Detailed Program Review of In Vitro Fertilization with a
Discussion and Comparison of Alternative Approaches, 162 SURGERY, GYNECOLOGY & OB-
STETRICS 89, 90 (1986).
7 Marsden G. Wagner & Patricia Stephenson, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization: Is
the Tail Wagging the Dog?, in TOUGH CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTIL17-ATION AND THE REPRO-
DuCrrVE TECHNOLOGIES 1, 2 (Patricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993).
8 Alan 0. Trounson & Carl Wood, /VF and Related Technology: The Present and the
Future, 158 MED. J. OF AUSTL. 853, 854 (1993).
9 Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regu-
latory Framework for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625, 633
(1991).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 633-34. With a laparoscopy, a needle is inserted through the woman's
abdomen and gentle suction is used to retrieve the eggs. Feliciano, supra note 2, at
307. A transvaginal ultrasound locates structures by measuring reflections of high
frequency waves, and does not require anesthesia. Feliciano, supra note 2, at 307;
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1883 (26th ed. 1995).
12 Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United States and Canada: 1992 Results Gener-
ated from The American Fertility Society / Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology Registry,
62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1121, 1123 tbl. 1 (1994) [hereinafter 1992 IVF-ET Registry
Report]. An alternative to having the recipient produce her own eggs is to use one
provided by a donor.
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B. Fertilization and Implantation
Once eggs are obtained they are placed with sperm in a petri
dish containing a special medium and allowed to fertilize and grow
to the four-cell stage.' 3 At this point, the embryos are ready for
transfer into the recipient's uterus.1' This is done with the use of a
catheter inserted through the woman's cervix and into her
uterus.15 The number of embryos transplanted is usually balanced
with evidence that as the number of embryos transferred increases,
so does the pregnancy rate.' 6
If transfer is successful, the embryos will attach to the uterine
wall and continue as if a natural conception had occurred.' 7
Throughout the woman's first trimester, she is given estrogen and
progesterone replacement therapy to help maintain the preg-
nancy. 8 The woman, if given drugs to increase ovulation, is also
given a series of drugs to return her cycle to normal. 19
C. Storage
If superovulation has produced a high number of eggs for
which implantation at one time is unwarranted or unwanted, a
technique is used which allows doctors to freeze the "extra" em-
bryos for later implantation.2" Called cryopreservation, this tech-
nique has proven instrumental in the field. In cryopreservation,
embryos are placed in vials containing a freezing medium and a
13 James M. Treppa, In Vitro Fertilization Through Egg Donation: A Prospective View of
Legal Issues, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 777, 781 (1992).
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 The 1989 IVF-ET Registry reported that clinical pregnancy rates and corre-
sponding live delivery rates among reporting fertility clinics were 15% and 13% re-
spectively for transfers of less than three embryos, 21% and 16% respectively for
transfer of three embryos, and 25% and 18% respectively for transfer of four or more
embryos. In Vitro Fertilization-Embryo Transfer (IVF-ET) in the United States: 1989 Results
from the 1VF-ETRegistry, 55 FERTILIY & STERILITY 14, 16 (1991) [hereinafter 1989 IVF-
ET Registry Report]. The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), part
of The American Fertility Society (AFS) and Medical Research International (MRI),
was established to "explore the epidemiology of the [assisted reproductive technolo-
gies]." Id. at 14.
17 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
18 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781 n.27 (citing Mark V. Sauer et al., A Preliminary
Report on Oocyte Donation Extending Reproductive Potential to Women over 40, 323 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1157, 1158 (1990)).
19 Katheryn D. Katz, Ghost Mothers: Human Egg Donation and the Legacy of the Past, 57
ALB. L. REv. 733, 773 (1994).
20 Eggen, supra note 9, at 638.
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cryoprotective agent.2' The temperature of the vials are then low-
ered from 220 C (room temperature) to -80' C.22 The frozen vials
are then placed in liquid nitrogen at a temperature of -196' C.
21
At this temperature, biological activity is not considered possible.24
Embryos are typically frozen at the 2-, 4-, or 8-cell stage since earlier
or later embryos are too difficult to freeze or do not develop nor-
mally once thawed.25
Cryopreservation lowers the risk of multiple births by allowing
only one or two embryos to be implanted at one time and the
others preserved for later use.26 Freezing the unused embryos also
saves a woman from having to repeat the ovulation and egg collec-
tion process, thereby saving her body from additional drug therapy
and controlling costs of the procedure with each implantation.27
Cryopreservation is also useful in cases where there is some compli-
cation during the stimulation cycle or where patients will be under-
going medical therapy that will cause sterility (i.e., for leukemia or
breast cancer) .28 Alternatively, cryopreservation might be used
when a woman undergoes sterilization and wishes to store any eggs
available at the time of surgery for possible later use.29 Proponents
note that once cryopreservation has been perfected, women will be
able to store unfertilized eggs in much the same way men are cur-
rently able to freeze their sperm. 0
In 1989, the IVF-ET SART Registry reported the transfer of
2,124 cryopreserved embryos by 110 reporting clinics. Ten of these
clinics accounted for 56% of the total clinical pregnancy rate
(11%) and 54% of the overall live delivery rate (8%)." In general,
an 8-12% increase in IVF pregnancies occurs by using cryopreserva-
tion.3 2 This may be attributable to psychological and physical ben-
efits cryopreservation offers women undergoing IVF.
21 Phyllis L. Bean, Comment, Taking the Frozen Embryo to Court in Virginia: A Proposed
Statute, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 127, 130 (1990).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Colleen M. Browne & Brian J. Hynes, Note, The Legal Status of Frozen Embryos:
Analysis and Proposed Guidelines for a Uniform Law, 17J. OF LEGIS. 97, 99 (1990).
26 See Eggen, supra note 9, at 638.
27 See Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
28 Trounson & Wood, supra note 8, at 855.
29 Eggen, supra note 9, at 640 n.53.
30 Katz, supra note 19, at 771.
31 1989 IVF-ET Registry Report, supra note 16, at 20.
32 Treppa, supra note 13, at 781.
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III. IVF AS A TOOL OF GENDER INEQUALITY
As noted earlier, this note argues IF can create inequitable
power structures for the women who turn to it. This can occur
through the power dynamic involved in using IVF as well as
through the selective control over who has access to the technol-
ogy. This section discusses IVF's potential misuse by: 1) analyzing
the power structure within IVF which minimizes women's control,
and 2) discussing the select demographics of IVF users.
The power relationship within IVF takes various forms. The
relationships between the women and the technology, the women
as patients and their doctors, and the concept of informed con-
sent, are all examples of how IVF creates inequitable power struc-
tures for women and will be discussed below.
A. Women v. Technology
Women using -VF turn to the technology because they are
told the technology can overcome a defect of their own bodies-
infertility. When they turn to 1VF women place their control over
their bodies into the hands of the technology. But is this neces-
sary? Women's relationship with the technology, built on a belief
that the technology can grant fertility, may be based on unreasona-
ble definitions of infertility. If so, women may be turning to IVF
too soon and in so doing unnecessarily cede power over their per-
son to the technology.
The United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
defines infertility as the inability to conceive after one year of inter-
course without contraception.3 Critics such as Janice Raymond
point out that this definition does not take into consideration
couples who already have children who only recently became "in-
fertile." 4 Noting that the time requirement of the OTA definition
of infertility has decreased within the past decade to its current one
year requirement, Raymond questions the appropriateness of such
a time frame since older women and those previously on birth con-
trol can sometimes experience temporary infertility. 5 If women
33 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 3. Not all agencies, however, use such a
lenient definition of infertility. The World Health Organization (WHO) requires a
two year inability to conceive to meet the definition of infertility. Wagner & Stephen-
son, supra note 7, at 3.
34 JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM 5 (1993).
35 Id. at 3.
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are turning to IVF too soon, they are exposing themselves to un-
necessary physical, psychological, and financial burdens.
Critics such as Wagner and Stephenson argue that the one
year period is misleading. They point to one study which sug-
gested only 16% to 21% of couples originally meeting this one year
definition of infertility remained infertile throughout their lives.3 6
Further, they argue that the definition does not take into consider-
ation the frequency of intercourse. One study reported that
"16.7% of couples having intercourse less than once a week con-
ceived within [six] months, but 83.3% of couples having inter-
course four or more times a week conceived within that same
period."3 7
Ruth Hubbard has also suggested that this time requirement is
inadequate.3 8 She cites a 1983 study which found that over a two to
seven year period, 41 % of couples undergoing fertility treatments
became pregnant, as did 35% of those couples who did not pursue
the fertility treatments.3 9 Indeed, Wagner and Stephenson suggest
infertility "has become a kind of new morbidity-a medical recon-
struction of a social problem, that is, involuntary childlessness. "40
IVF and infertility treatments have also been criticized as not
being true aids to infertile women as the goal is not to correct in-
fertility, but only to bypass it. One study comparing IVF pregnancy
rates versus surgery procedures designed to repair the damaged
reproductive systems, found a continuing pregnancy rate of 25% to
30% with microsurgery or laser surgery using a laparoscope to re-
pair damaged fallopian tubes, a continuing pregnancy rate of 21%
to 41% for procedures with carbon-dioxide lasers in "fertility-pro-
moting procedures," and a 30% to 70% continuing pregnancy rate
for a "laser applied through a laparoscope, either alone or in con-
junction with danazol . ". .. "'4 This is compared to a continuing
pregnancy rate with IVF of 10%, plus the need for repeat proce-
dures with each pregnancy the woman desires.42 In response,
groups such as the Feminist International Network of Resistance to
Reproductive and Genetic Engineering (FINRRAGE), argue that
36 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 3.
37 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 6.
38 RUTH HUBBARD, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BIOLOGY 203 (1990).
39 Id. at 203.
40 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 2.
41 H. David Banta, Technology Assessment and Infertility Care, in TOUGH CHOICES: IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 53, 58-59 (Patricia Ste-
phenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993).
42 Id. at 59.
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the focus should be shifted away from the reproductive technology
and instead placed on identifying the causes of infertility and re-
searching prevention.4 3
If, as these critics suggest, current definitions of infertility lead
to over diagnosis of infertility, women may be turning to IVF who
do not need to and in so doing placing themselves in unnecessary
danger. The safety of clinics, for example, has been questioned.
An outbreak of hepatitis which affected 172 women, was reported
in one IVF program in The Netherlands.44 The culture medium
used to grow fertilized embryos was contaminated with hepatitis B
virus.45 This type of physical danger is in addition to the ceding of
control of one's body to the technology.
B. Patient v. Doctor Relationship
As women coming to IVF clinics usually are emotionally and
physically drained and often see IVF as their last chance to have
biological offspring,46 the patient/doctor relationship in IVF is po-
tentially problematic. This relationship can cause women to be-
come subjugated to a technology "owned" by the doctor. This
ownership of -VF technology has the potential to minimize wo-
men's roles as women, mothers, and individuals, and to make wo-
men mere vessels in the process of childbirth. Indeed in many
cases, IVF doctors are perceived as giving life where the women
have failed. This dynamic can place extreme guilt and anxiety on
women who see their compliance with IVF protocols as the only
way to become pregnant. One study of 200 pre-treatment couples
noted that 49% of women believed infertility to be the most upset-
ting experience of their lives.47 This is compared to only 15% of
the men interviewed.48
Women lose autonomy over their reproductive identity when
43 Susan Behuniak-Long, Radical Conceptions: Reproductive Technologies and Feminist
Theories, 10 WOMEN & POLITICS 39, 51-52 (1990).
44 Pat Spallone, Reproductive Health and Reproductive Technology, in WOMEN AND
HEALTH: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 49, 58 (Sue Wilkinson & Celia Kitzinger eds., 1994).
45 Id.
46 Dorothy Greenfeld & Florence Haseltine, Candidate Selection and Psychosocial Con-
siderations of In-Vitro Fertilization Procedures, 29 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 119,
119 (1986) (reporting couples coming to IVF programs have long histories of infertil-
ity treatment including drug therapy and surgery).
47 Id. at 123. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209,
215 (1995) [hereinafter Roberts, Genetic Tie] ("[P]eople often see the inability to pro-
duce one's own children as one of nature's most tragic curses.").
48 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 123.
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they begin IVF programs. Ann Oakley described the phenomena
in this manner:
For a complex of reasons, then, reproduction exposes the social
fragility of women, not as the weaker but as the second sex, to use
Simone de Beauvoir's term. Women's existence as childbearers
is subject to a central paradox: although the most socially impor-
tant activity, it is also rendered the least important, as cultural
ideologies and practices enforce women's marginalization.49
Also note the relationship between Leslie Brown, the mother of
the world's first IVF baby, and her doctors, Drs. Steptoe and Ed-
wards. Her doctors insisted Brown not tell anyone about the pro-
cedure and had her sign an agreement consenting to an abortion
if the doctors thought it necessary.50 "Presumably [the doctors]
did not want to have the entire venture discredited by letting the
first baby be born with a disability."5 Again, women's interests and
reproductive autonomy are subjugated to the larger goals of creat-
ing a technology and in the doctors controlling it.
C. Informed v. Uninformed Consent
Critics of IVF have charged that due to a lack of enforcement
of informed consent or even a specific definition of what consti-
tutes informed consent, women turning to IVF are placed in the
position of ceding their control to a technology which many argue
is still, despite the medical community's assurances to the contrary,
experimental. 2 These critics charge that no clinical trials, cost
analysis, analysis of social consequences, or ethical discussions have
been performed, and that IVF should remain an experimental pro-
cedure and be ruled by the "safeguards covering research on
human subjects."" Questions such as these concerning the experi-
mental nature of LVF make informed consent questionable.
Wagner and Stephenson also express concern over the ways
pregnancy success rates are reported.54 For example, they noted
that women experienced disappointment when they found out that
the 20-25% pregnancy rate reported by one clinic was misleading.55
49 ANN OAKLEY, EssAYs ON WOMEN, MEDICINE AND HEALTH 99 (1993) (footnote
omitted). Oakley is referring to the work The Second Sex by Simone de Beauvoir. See
generally SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 1952) (1949).
50 Hubbard, supra note 38, at 204.
51 Hubbard, supra note 38, at 204.
52 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 1.
53 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 1.
54 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
55 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
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In actuality, only 40% of women in that program reached the 20%-
25% point.56 Unfortunately this was information the women found
out only after entering the program." For women to make in-
formed decisions about their participation in IVF programs, they
need to have accurate and standardized information. However,
the use of different pregnancy definitions can also mislead women.
Variations in reporting rates of pregnancy are attributed to dif-
ferent meanings given to pregnancy-clinical pregnancy versus
pregnancy resulting in delivery. If a woman is pregnant for two
days and then suffers a miscarriage, an IVF clinic may refer to this
as a successful pregnancy and report it as such.5 Women's goals
are a "take-home" baby and not solely a pregnancy.59 These rates
are obviously very different. Compare the two compilations of the
same facts presented below. The 1992 IVF-ET Registry reported
that 29,404 IVF cycles were conducted in 1992 with the following
break-down:
85% of cycles led to an egg retrieval (24,996)
87.5% of retrievals led to an embryo transfer (21,870)
24.1% of transfers led to a clinical pregnancy (5,279)
16.8% live delivery rate per retrieval (4,206)60
Note these percentages are derived from the total number of cycles
that led to an egg retrieval.
Now look at the information presented another way. Here,
the total number of cycles becomes the reference point for each
calculation, regardless of whether it led to an egg retrieval:
85% of all cycles led to an egg retrieval (24,996)
74.4% of all cycles led to an egg transfer (21,870)
18% of all cycles led to a clinical pregnancy (5,279)
14.3% of all cycles led to a live delivery (4,206)
The 14.3% live delivery rate may be of more value to women as it
standardizes the reference point-cycles-as well as addresses wo-
men's association with each cycle with a birth. This is not to say
that 14.3% (or one out of seven) of each woman's cycles will lead
to a live birth. These figures do not include information on causes
of infertility and, therefore, do not take into account women for
whom IVF has a higher probability of success than those for whom
56 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
57 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
58 Dr. Martha Field, Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy: Legal Issues, 25 CREIGH-
TON L. REv. 1589, 1597 (1992).
59 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 8.
60 1992 IVF-ET Registry Report, supra note 12, at 1123 tbl. 1.
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it does not.6 In part to remedy the discrepancy in expectations,
Dr. Martha Field suggests women get counseling on the success
rates, costs, psychological stress, and available alternatives before
beginning an IVF program.6"
This lack of clear and accurate information hampers a wo-
man's ability to give full and informed consent. But further, the
severe emotional toll and anxiety women are under when they
come to VF clinics also impacts on a woman's ability to make in-
formed decisions. Wagner and Stephenson indicated that it is nec-
essary to investigate how IVF is marketed, how success rates are
calculated, how they are communicated to patients, how hospitals
sell the experimental procedures, and how physicians disclose the
risks of IVF."6
While this could be construed as a problem within the medical
industry rather than one specific to women, two items are impor-
tant to remember. First, in a society and industry which are de-
fined by male standards, women are typically placed second.
Second, those steps that have been taken to try and control the IVF
industry have basically been geared to the needs of consumers, not
women.
Informed consent is of imperative importance in a technology
like IVF where women come to the technology desperate for a baby
and often view IVF as their last chance.64 Nancy Ehrenreich notes
that "by ceding [the doctor] all control over her reproductive
processes, [a woman] disempowers herself in a way likely to be
deeply destructive of her sense of self."65 These feelings were ex-
pressed by Mrs. J, a woman undergoing IVF treatments, in a 1986
publication of candidate selection:
It's like a steeplechase. One hurdle after another. First you
worry that you won't be accepted in the program. After you are
accepted, you worry about all that waiting and the enormous
cost. Once you start the program, you worry that you might do
something wrong or that you will not understand the instruc-
tion. Then you worry about getting the injections and the ef-
fects of the drugs that they give you. Then you worry that they
will not get eggs. Or that the eggs won't fertilize. Finally, they
do the implant and you are hit with what you feared all along-
61 1992 ]VF-ET Registry Report, supra note 12, at 1122-23.
62 Field, supra note 58, at 1597.
63 Wagner & Stephenson, supra note 7, at 17.
64 See Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 119 (suggesting long histories of
surgery and drug therapy in couples entering IVF programs).
65 Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuKE L.J. 492, 495 (1993).
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that you won't get pregnant.66
You might do something wrong and as a result you may not get
pregnant. This relationship makes informed consent questionable.
Susan Bordo sums the effects of medical technologies on wo-
men's ability to choose by stating:
On the one hand, women now have a booming technology
seemingly focused on fulfilling their desires: to conceive, to pre-
vent miscarriage, to deliver a healthy baby at term. On the
other hand, proponents and practitioners continually en-
courage women to treat their bodies as passive instruments of
those goals, ready and willing, "if they want a child badly
enough," to endure however complicated and invasive a regime
of diagnostic testing, daily monitoring, injections, and operative
procedures may be required.67
One report noted that of ninety-one couples dropping out after
one IVF attempt, fifty-five (60.4%) said anxiety was their reason for
not continuing.68
The anxiety to have a child and the concern that their actions
might harm their chances, force women's identities to be subli-
mated to the technology, the doctor, and inaccurate definitions of
informed consent. Women coming to 1VF are placed in an inter-
minable bind: they are told their bodies are incapable of produc-
ing offspring without aid (a misnomer as many couples are now
undergoing lVF for male related infertility problems69 ), that IVF is
their last chance, and if no baby is produced it is due to a woman's
non-compliance to a strict protocol (when in reality compliance
does not guarantee a baby).
IV. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF LVF USE
On one hand, we have a technology which says it offers women
the possibility of having children they could not have before. On
the other hand, we have the narrowing of the reproductive auton-
omy of the women turning to lVF. There is also another concern
with IVF use-the demography of IVF users. Currently, a relatively
select subgroup of United States society turns to LVF. Although the
data on IVF users is sparse, available data suggest an unequal use of
66 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 123-24.
67 SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE
BODY 86 (1993).
68 Greenfeld & Haseltine, supra note 46, at 124.
69 Sharyn L. Roach Anleu, Reproductive Autonomy and Reproductive Technology: Gen-
der, Deviance and Infertility, in INTERSECTIONS: WOMEN ON LAw, MEDICINE AND TECHNOL-
oGY 99, 105 (Kerry Petersen ed., 1997).
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IVF by white, middle-/upper-class, married women. A brief discus-
sion of the voices missing from IVF use and its ramifications are
discussed below.
A. Poor Women
The cost of IVF has been estimated to be between $67,000 and
$114,000.0 This insures that most poor women cannot access fer-
tility programs without outside help. But according to the Com-
mittee to Study Outreach for Prenatal Care, more than one-fourth
of all "women of reproductive age... have no insurance to cover
maternity care, and two-thirds of [this population of reproductive
age] have no health insurance at all."7' For the uninsured, the
costs of IVF can be prohibitive.72
A 'justification" for the exclusion of poor women from access
to IVF services is based on a stereotypical association of poor wo-
men and children-that poor women have children to get more
money from state assistance programs. Issues like sterilization and
mandatory Norplant use are based on this perception 7 3-regard-
less of its validity. Society stereotypes poor women as having "too
many children" which "we" have to support. With this mindset, it is
unlikely that mechanisms will be established which would aid infer-
tile poor women in accessing IVF,7" and indeed as will be suggested
70 Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 948
(1996) [hereinafter Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction].
71 Michelle Oberman, The Control of Pregnancy and the Criminalization of Femaleness, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 9 (1992).
72 Id.
73 Note that this perception also has racial overtones. One report noted that the
African-American poverty rate was 31%, despite the fact that African-Americans con-
stituted only 12% of the United States population. Vernellia R_ Randall, Slavery, Segre-
gation and Racism: Trusting the Health Care System Ain't Always Easy! An African American
Perspective on Bioethics, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 191, 212 (1996).
74 John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of
the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 989 (1986) ("At the present time the state
has no legal obligation to provide infertility services to indigents ...."). Roberts,
Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 245 n.140 ("Indeed, a major aim of current welfare re-
form proposals is to discourage women on welfare from having children.").
Note a report by Svensson and Stephenson which gave an example from one
state to show how some women were discouraged from using IVF. Per-Gunnar Sven-
sson & Patricia Stephenson, Equity and Resource Distribution in Infertility Care, in TOUCH
CHOICES: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND THE REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 161, 163 (Pa-
tricia Stephenson & Marsden G. Wagner eds., 1993). Svensson and Stephenson re-
ported that Oregon extended its eligibility for public health insurance funds to cover
all people below the federal poverty level, although limits were placed on the medical
services paid with public funding. Id. Medical procedures were ranked by a cost-
utility procedure which rated each treatment by the benefit to the patient per unit of
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
later, it is often the case that poor women's reproductive autonomy
is instead severely limited.
B. Women of Color
Various studies dating from as early as the 1900s suggest that
the infertility rate for African-American women is much higher
than that for white women. For example, Paula Giddings reports
in her book, When and Where I.Enter, two studies which suggest the
African-American infertility rate was as high as fifty percent.7 5 She
also reports a 1942 doctoral dissertation from Columbia University
which suggested a forty-one percent childlessness rate among Afri-
can-American college women. v6 In 1996, Roberts reported the in-
fertility rate for married African-American women was one and one
half times higher than married white women. 7 But despite their
high infertility rate, African-American women have not partici-
pated in reproductive services at the same rate as white women.78
Dr. Cheryl J. Sanders, in her article on African-American wo-
men and reproductive technologies, suggests one general reason
for African-American women's relative absence from reproductive
technologies is a less exclusive definition of family.79  Sanders
notes the idea of one mother, one father, and genetic offspring,
which has led to stigmatization when that ideal cannot be met, is
not necessarily an accurate family structure for African-American
families. "[T]he inclusion of infertile couples and individuals as
valued members of the extended family, and especially as partici-
pants in rearing children, seems to have erased or minimized
whatever stigma may have been attached to infertility by society."80
cost. Of the 714 items on the priority list, IVF was ranked 701. Id. A clear disincen-
tive for women on public health insurance to use IVF.
75 Dr. Cheryl J. Sanders, Surrogate Motherhood and Reproductive Technologies: An Afri-
can American Perspective, 25 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1707, 1715 (1992).
76 PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
-RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 248, 379 n.30 (1984). Giddings suggests many factors were
involved in this 41% rate including an unconscious revolt against being forced into
the role of mothers. Id. at 248.
77 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 939.
78 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1715; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 244
("The people in the United States most likely to be infertile are older, poorer, Black,
and poorly educated. Most couples who use IVF services are white, highly educated,
and affluent." (footnote omitted)).
79 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 214
("[B]lood ties are less significant to the definition of family in the Black community
than they traditionally have been for white America.").
80 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15; see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 231-
32 (African-American culture is not dependent on the genetic ties).
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Sanders suggests that more fluid definitions of family have given
African-American families more alternatives in defining themselves
to the extent that they are not "forced" by society to produce ge-
netic offspring.8
While African-American women may have more choices in
family structure, racial stereotypes may narrow the available oppor-
tunities of African-American women who may wish to choose IVF.
As Sanders notes, the stereotypical image of the African-American
woman is the "public enemy whose babies are a burden to society
at large, unless, of course, she can produce sons who play football
or basketball."8 2 Also, note a phone conversation Sanders reported
between herself and a representative from the Surrogate Parenting
Association in Louisville, Kentucky, which although specifically ad-
dressing surrogacy is applicable here: "When I asked why so few
[African-Americans] participated in surrogacy arrangements, I was
given several reasons: 1) [African-American] babies are easier to
adopt; 2) the services are prohibitively expensive; and 3) [African-
Americans] are not solely interested in biological offspring. "83
Sanders notes: "the experience of racism and racial discrimination
breeds both skepticism and pessimism with regard to the question
of whether white advances in technology and medicine are irrele-
vant or even inimical to the well-being of [African-Americans]."84
C. Lesbian Women
In a 1984 report on the efficacy of single women and artificial
insemination (AI), two doctors who ran an Al clinic stated they
would only consider married heterosexual couples, and would not
consider lesbian couples or single women for their programs.85
Another doctor stated:
81 See generally Sanders, supra note 75, at 1714-15.
82 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1713.
83 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1715.
84 Sanders, supra note 75, at 1716. Roberts also reports that white women may be
diagnosed with infertility, and thus pointed towards reproductive technologies, more
often than African-American women.
[D]octors are more likely to diagnose white professional women with
infertility problems such as endometriosis that can be treated with in
vitro fertilization. In 1976, one doctor found that over 20[%] of his
[African-American] patients who had been diagnosed as having pelvic
inflammatory disease, often treated with sterilization, actually suffered
from endometriosis.
Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 940 (footnote omitted).
85 Carson Strong &Jay S. Schinfeld, The Single Woman and Artificial Insemination by
Donor, 29 J. REPROD. MED. 293, 294 (1984); see Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at
241 n.125 (many lVF clinics accept only heterosexual married couples).
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
[T] he restriction of the service to 'married heterosexual unions'
looks right. If, as we assume, the dominant and inescapable in-
terest must be that of the child and his enjoying a normal up-
bringing-an interest, it may be added, which can be
overlooked or subordinated to the couple's longing for
parenthood-then deliberately to contrive its birth into a les-
bian union or to a single woman would be to deny it justice.86
One might assume lesbians also turn to IVF to meet their desire for
children. Whether this is true or not, however, remains uncertain
as there are no studies on the use, or attempted use, of 1VF by
lesbians.
"Officially" few IVF programs accept lesbians.87 As Ann
Oakley reports "[a] ccess to IVF is controlled by an outdated ideol-
ogy which sees the heterosexual nuclear family as the only proper
recipe for parenthood."88 The same belief which tended to perpet-
uate opposition to lesbian custody89 also pervades access by lesbi-
ans to IVF. The stereotypical beliefs maintain an exclusionary lock
on access to IVF-at least officially.
V. A LARGER PATTERN OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL
If IVF is ever to be used for aiding women's search for repro-
ductive autonomy, it is important to understand what drives wo-
men to turn to IVF, what expectations they have, and what are
their outcomes. But one must be careful in treading this line. As
Hilary Rose noted in speaking of the world's first test tube mother:
"'It is one thing to argue against a specific technological develop-
ment which is against the interests of women.., it is quite another
to say to Lesley Brown (or any other infertile woman) that it was
86 Strong & Schinfeld, supra note 85, at 294.
87 Roberts, Genetic Tie, supra note 47, at 240-41 ("[F]ertility clinics routinely deny
their services to single women, lesbians, women with genetic disorders, and women
who are not considered good mothers."); see Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction,
supra note 70, at 936 ("Most IVF clinics only accept heterosexual married couples as
clients, and most physicians have been unwilling to assist in the insemination of single
women." (citations omitted)).
88 Oakley, supra note 49, at 178.
89 Generally, homosexuality is not considered an acceptable factor in making cus-
tody decisions today. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985) (it was
impermissible for a court to rely on any real or imagined stigma associated with a
mother being lesbian in custody decisions); M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1979) (mother's homosexuality was not a ground for change in cus-
tody); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (homosexual father
could not be denied overnight visitation with his children as a result of his homosexu-
ality); Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d I (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (mother's desire to
share her lesbian relationship with her children was not a change in circumstance to
warrant an alteration in custody agreement).
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wrong for her to have Louise.' 9 0 Ann Oakley asks, "[i ]f we say that
the industry of new procreative technologies should be halted,
what do we say to women who want to become mothers, and who
believe that investment in this industry is their only means of doing
so?" 9 1
It seems there is no way to halt reproductive technologies, nor
does that seem an appropriate decision. As Oakley pointed out, it
would not be equitable to protect women by punishing them. Do-
ing so places the onus upon a woman by saying she must protect
herself by refraining from using these medical advances. Instead, a
better alternative would be to claim the technologies as women's
own. One way of doing this is to place IVF within a larger pattern
of controlling all women's reproductive autonomy. Only in this
way can we really see what domination does to all women. Only in
this way will medical, legal, and feminist theorists be able to realize
the use of IVF to control reproductive autonomy is not an isolated
issue, but rather part of a history and pattern of domination.
White women, women of color, poor women, lesbian women,
all women, are being systematically denied reproductive auton-
omy.92 The forced sterilization of women, the use of Norplant to
control poor women's reproduction, and the prosecution of
mothers for fetal abuse, will be discussed in order to lay the
groundwork for a discussion below to typify the larger pattern of
controlling all women's reproductive autonomy.
A. Forced Sterilization
Believing that social problems resulted from social defects, the
"socially undesirable" were sterilized as a means of race control.93
The first compulsory sterilization bill to be proposed was intro-
90 Oakley, supra note 49, at 180 (citation omitted).
91 Oakley, supra note 49, at 180 (citation omitted).
92 Women are being denied reproductive autonomy in many areas. See, e.g., Lyng
v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635 (1986) (upholding provision of Food Stamp Act which gave
lesser benefits to nuclear families than to unrelated persons or extended families
comprising a single household); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (denying statu-
tory and constitutional challenge to the Hyde Amendment which prohibited the use
of federal funds for certain types of abortions); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977)
(upholding application of the Social Security Act which provided for termination of
benefits paid to a disabled dependent child of a deceased wage earner upon the
child's marriage to someone not receiving benefits); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977) (excluding elective abortions from state Medicaid funding did not unduly bur-
den a women's right to an abortion).
93 Steven S. Spitz, Note, The Norplant Debate: Birth Control or Woman Control?, 25
COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 131, 135 (1993).
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duced but defeated in the Michigan legislature in 1897.9' A sec-
ond attempt, occurred in 1905 in Pennsylvania when the
legislature passed "An Act for the Prevention of Idiocy." 95 The bill
was vetoed by the Governor.96 The first bill to be enacted, a 1907
Indiana bill, allowed for the sterilization of criminals, idiots, imbe-
ciles, and rapists in state institutions upon the recommendation of
a board of experts.97
The eugenics movement in the United States quickly followed
and reached its peak in the late 1920s.98 By 1942, thirty-two states
had passed compulsory sterilization bills.9 9 It is estimated that over
60,000 individuals were forcibly sterilized to ostensibly eliminate so-
cial problems like "poverty, mental illness, mental retardation, dis-
ease, and criminality ....*"100
In 1927, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of forced ster-
ilization in the case Buck v. Bell.' In this case, Carrie Buck
brought a constitutional challenge to the Virginia sterilization stat-
ute.10 2 She was a resident of the State Colony for Epileptics and
the Feeble Minded, and was chosen to be sterilized by the State
Colony's superintendent because of believed "hereditary forms of
insanity [or] imbecility . . . ."0 Buck was thought to be the off-
spring of a "feeble minded" woman and had herself recently given
birth to a girl who was assumed to also be "feeble minded."' °4 Jus-
tice Holmes, writing for the majority and affirming the decision of
the lower courts, stated: "[i] t is better for all the world, if instead of
waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them
starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are mani-
festly unfit from continuing their kind .... Three generations of
imbeciles are enough." 10 5 It is interesting to note that Justice
Holmes himself was an ardent eugenicist. In an article he wrote in
1915 for the Illinois Law Review he stated: "I believe that the whole-
sale social regeneration .. .cannot be affected appreciably by tink-
ering with the institution of property, but only by taking in hand
94 Id. at 135 n.25.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 135.
99 Id. at 135 n.25.
100 Katz, supra note 19, at 742.
101 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
102 Id. at 201.
103 Id. at 205-06.
104 Id. at 205.
105 Id. at 207 (citation omitted).
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life and trying to build a race." ' 6
It was not until fifteen years later in Skinner v. Oklahoma,10 7 a
case dealing with the sterilization of a male "habitual criminal ,"108
that the Supreme Court held the right to procreation was a "basic
civil rights of man." 0 9 According to the Supreme Court, "[w] e are
dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race."11 Skinner clearly states the
right to procreate is a fundamental right. Nonetheless, forced ster-
ilization is still employed.
One reason for this, despite Skinner, is because the Supreme
Court decided Skinner on equal protection grounds rather than di-
rectly denouncing mandatory sterilization laws and overturning the
Buck decision.'11 As a result, sterilization laws are still on many
state books and "[u] nder either its police power or parens palriae
authority, a state retains the power to determine who should
reproduce."' 12
The use of sterilization laws today has broadened from "in-
competents" to included racial, ethnic, and class stereotypes. Dor-
othy Roberts argues that "abusive sterilization" is a means to
control African-American women's reproductive lives. 1 ' She be-
lieves the stereotype of African-American women as sexually pro-
miscuous has helped devalue their roles as mothers and created a
push for stricter control over African-American women's reproduc-
tive options." 4 Further, she argues the systematic denial of Afri-
can-American women's reproductive autonomy harkens back to
slavery, when slave owners controlled African-American women's
reproduction and used it as a means of control." 5 As evidence of
the modern day control of African-American women's reproduc-
106 Spitz, supra note 93, at 136 n.32 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and
Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1915)).
107 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
108 Id. at 537.
109 Id. at 541.
110 Id.
111 Spitz, supra note 93, at 138-39.
112 Spitz, supra note 93, at 139 n.46. Note, however, that despite the fact that states
can still have sterilization laws, forced sterilization and consensual sterilization laws
must now overcome constitutional challenges to be upheld. Julie Marcus, In re Ro-
mero: Sterilization and Competency, 68 DENV. U. L. REv. 105, 107 (1991).
113 Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1427 (1991) [hereinafter
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts].
114 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1436-39.
115 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1439.
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tion, she points to the rates of enforced sterilization for which Afri-
can-American women are inordinately represented.'16 A 1973
study reported that 43% of women sterilized under a federally
funded program were African-American, though only 33% of the
patients were African-American.17 A 1989 study reported that
9.7% of African-American women with college educations had
been sterilized, in contrast to only 5.6% of white women with col-
lege educations. 1 8 Further, 31.6% of African-American women
without a high school diploma were sterilized, while only 14.5% of
white women had been sterilized." 9
Roberts suggests African-American women are under a partic-
ular bind as African-American women are five times more likely to
be below the poverty line, and therefore in need of government
supported medical programs, than white women. 20 This unequal
balance exposes African-American women to greater governmental
control and thereby exposes them to greater controls over their
reproductive autonomy.' 2' For example, one study in North Caro-
lina reported that between 1933 and 1973 over 7500 women were
sterilized; of these women, about 5000 were African-American. 122
African-American women, however, are not the only ones to
be over represented among those sterilized. Spanish-speaking wo-
men are twice as likely to be sterilized as English-speaking wo-
men. 123 Of all the races in the United States, African-American
women and Hispanic women are the most likely to be sterilized. 124
Davis reports that by the 197 0s, 35% of all women of childbearing
age in Puerto Rico had been sterilized. 125 By 1976, 24% of all Na-
tive American women of child bearing age had been sterilized.' 26
Further, it is reported in 1972 alone, between 100,000 and 200,000
sterilizations were performed by government funded programs. 27
116 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442-43.
117 Roberts, Punishing Dr'ug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442 n.125 (citing Dick Gros-
boll, Note, Sterilization Abuse: Current State of the Law and Remedies for Abuse, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REv. 1147, 1153 n.30 (1980)).
118 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 942.
119 Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, supra note 70, at 942.
120 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1432 n.60.
121 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1432.
122 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE
AND CLAss 202, 217 (1981)).
123 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1442-43 n.125.
124 Jeanne L. Vance, Womb for Rent: Norplant and the Undoing of Poor Women, 21 HAs-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 827, 833 (1994).
125 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 219).
126 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 218).
127 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAvis, supra note 122, at 218).
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Perhaps more alarming, a survey of facilities performing steriliza-
tions in 1975 found that only 60% of the them were aware of gov-
ernment guidelines regulating sterilization and only 30% of
facilities were trying to comply with these regulations.128
Inconsistencies in the application of sterilization laws raise
questions over the reasons for its use. In Walker v. Pierce,129 a doc-
tor required an African-American woman in labor to consent to
sterilization before agreeing to assist her in delivering her fourth
child.1" 0 Contrast this with the story told by Ruth Colker of a white
law school classmate of hers who decided to be sterilized. 13 1 The
university doctor refused to allow the procedure unless the woman
agreed to undergo several sessions with a psychiatrist, presumably
as Colker says, to dissuade her from her decision. 13 2
Forced sterilization has been employed to selectively control
women's reproductive autonomy. Specifically, forced sterilization
seems to be employed most often to control the reproductive au-
tonomy of African-American women, Latina women, and poor wo-
men. One technology pushes a subgroup of women toward fertility
and another pushes a subgroup of women from fertility, though
both demonstrate a loss of reproductive control. The recent trend
by courts to use Norplant as a condition of parole also exemplifies
this selective control.
B. Norplant as a Probation Condition
With its release to the United States market, Norplant birth
control quickly became a tool for some courts to restrict women's
reproductive ability. Norplant, believed to be 98.5% effective in
preventing pregnancy over a five year period,133 was approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on December 10, 1990
as an "acceptable means of birth control in the United States."" 4
128 Ehrenreich, supra note 65, at 515 n.73 (citing DAViS, supra note 122, at 220).
129 560 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
130 Vance, supra note 124, at 833.
131 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1443 n.130 (citing Ruth
Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL.
L. REv. 1011, 1067 n.196 (1989)).
132 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1443 n.130 (citing Colker,
supra note 131, at 1067 n.196).
133 Vance, supra note 124, at 828 n.5 (citing American Medical Association, Require-
ments or Incentives by Government for the Use of Long-Acting Contraceptives, 267 J. Am. MED.
ASS'N 1818, 1818 (1992)).
134 Spitz, supra note 93, at 132. Many people suggest the safety of Norplant was
unknown as tests were still on-going or inconclusive. Specifically:
[a]n organization called Health Action International charges that the
examiners [of tests involving Third World women as Norplant subjects]
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However, like forced sterilization, Norplant has often been used
disproportionately against African-American and poor women.
To use Norplant, six thin, flexible capsules containing a syn-
thetic hormone, levonorgestrel, are inserted under the skin of the
upper arm.1 5 Norplant works by first suppressing ovulation with a
continuous release of levonorgestrel, and second by keeping the
cervical mucus thick and thereby preventing the sperm from reach-
ing and fertilizing the egg.1"6 Once inserted, Norplant can begin
working within twenty-four hours if inserted within the first seven
days of the woman's menstrual cycle.1 3 7 To remove, another in-
office surgical visit is required. 138 Norplant is not, however, with-
out constraints. Norplant is not recommended for women with
liver or heart disorders, blood clots, high blood pressure, breast
nodules, fibrocystic disease of the breast or an abnormal breast x-
ray, women with diabetes, high cholesterol or triglycerides, mi-
graines, epilepsy, mental depression, or gallbladder or kidney dis-
eases.' 3 9 In women not constrained from using Norplant, side
effects can include excessive or irregular vaginal bleeding, head-
aches, nervousness, nausea, dizziness, ovarian enlargement, derma-
titis, acne, and change in appetite.1 40
After its approval by the FDA, both state legislators and courts
were quick to try to use Norplant as a means to control women's
reproduction autonomy. In 1991, state legislators in Kansas at-
tempted to pass legislation which would encourage low income wo-
men on welfare or Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)1 4 1 to use Norplant by offering bonuses and increases in
lost track of whole groups of women and that they gave Norplant to
pregnant or lactating women. Women in Third World countries were
often so frightened by the procedure for implantation that they refused
to return to get the rods removed, even when they were experiencing
prolonged bleeding.
Karin E. Wilinski, Note, Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Controlling Women at the Ex-
pense of Human Rights,10 B.U. INr'L L.J. 351, 357-58 (1992) (citations omitted).
135 Spitz, supra note 93, at 132-33.
136 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133.
137 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133 n.ll.
138 Spitz, supra note 93, at 133.
139 Spitz, supra note 93, at 134 n.17.
140 Spitz, supra note 93, at 134 n.18.
141 AFDC was abolished in 1996 and replaced with the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which allowed block grants to go to
states from which states can individually tailor their welfare plans. Jane C. Murphy,
Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform, "Family, and Crim-
inal Law, 83 CORNELL L. Riv. 688, 734 (1998). Further, during its time AFDC itself
was not without conflict. See, e.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (AFDC re-
quirement that a family's eligibility for benefits take into account the income of all
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yearly benefits. 11 2 A 1991 report noted that 34.6% of AFDC recipi-
ents were African-American women.1 43 Compared to the fact that
African-American women made up only 6.35% of the United States
population, one begins to see the misuse of technology to control
African-American women's reproduction. The effect of state use of
Norplant, like enforced sterilization, also tended to target predom-
inately poor African-American women.
No Norplant bill has yet been made law; this is not, however,
due to a lack of interest by state legislators. In Mississippi and Flor-
ida, state senators proposed making welfare conditional upon Nor-
plant implantation.1 44 In Washington and North Carolina, on the
other hand, legislators proposed bills which would make Norplant
implantation mandatory for mothers whose babies are born with
fetal alcohol syndrome or drug addiction as determined at birth by
the hospitals.145 Other bills suggested increasing benefits for wo-
men who agreed to Norplant implantation. Among these states
were Ohio (increased welfare benefits), Colorado (a credit to in-
mates for a vasectomy, tubal ligation, or Norplant implant), Con-
necticut (a $700 bonus plus $200/year thereafter for Norplant
implant), and Florida (AFDC increase for Norplant or Depo
Provera use).146 Ex-Grand Wizard of the Klu Klux Klan and then
Louisiana state representative David Duke, introduced a bill in
Louisiana which in its original form offered incentives for mothers
on welfare with more than one child to use Norplant 1 47 Similarly,
Medicaid plans also provided funding for the insertion of Nor-
family members living in the same house was reasonable); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S.
309 (1971) (state requirement of a home visit for recipients of AFDC served a valid
purpose and did not violate recipients' privacy rights).
142 Spitz, supra note 93, at 141. Kansas also proposed legislation that would require
woman able to conceive and convicted of a felony possession of drugs to choose be-
tween jail or Norplant use. Wilinski, supra note 134, at 361-62.
143 Spitz, supra note 93, at 140 n.52 (citing Stephanie Denmark, Birth-Control Tyr-
anny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at A23).
144 Vance, supra note 124, at 829.
145 Vance, supra note 124, at 829. A problem in itself is that few rehabilitation pro-
grams will accept pregnant substance abusers. See Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts,
supra note 113, at 1448; see also Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362 (Washington proposed
a bill allowing for a petition to a court for insertion of Norplant for women who give
birth to babies with fetal alcohol syndrome or drug addiction).
146 Vance, supra note 124, at 829 n.12; see also Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362 (Flor-
ida's proposed bill would increase AFDC payments from $258/month to $400/month
for Norplant use).
147 Spitz, supra note 93, at 141, 143. Louisiana's proposed bill would pay $100/year
to poor women who choose Norplant. See Wilinski, supra note 134, at 362.
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plant. 48 As of 1996, all fifty states provided funding for Norplant
use through their Medicaid plans. 49
Critics have charged that both doctors and legislators have
misused Norplant. Doctors have been criticized for enticing low-
income and minority women into using Norplant without inform-
ing them of the cost of removal ($150150) or of potential side ef-
fects.' Others have charged that the bills would effectively "rent
a low-income women's womb for the duration of the implant" and
that the bonus would act as an incentive for women to have it im-
planted.1 5 2 Proponents may argue that the bonuses for having
Norplant implanted are too small to be a true incentive, but this
may be inaccurate. Under the proposed Florida bill, for example,
assistance to mothers on AFDC would increase from an average
$258/month to $400/month upon proof the mother is using Nor-
plant.153 Increasing a mother's assistance by more than half is not
a small incentive, but rather a bribe a low-income mother might be
hard pressed to turn down in spite of any side effects from the
implantation.
Courts have also attempted to use Norplant to control wo-
men's reproduction. The most notable case involved a judge con-
ditioning parole on Norplant implantation. Darlene Johnson, a
twenty-seven year old unwed mother of four, pregnant with her
fifth child, had been arrested and pled guilty to violating Califor-
nia's penal code prohibiting corporal injury to a child. 154 The
judge ordered her to attend counseling sessions and parenting
classes, not punish her children by striking them, not smoke, and
not use drugs during her pregnancy.1 5 5 A month later, Johnson
was sentenced to a year in jail and placed on three years proba-
tion.1 56 In addition to the above probation conditions, Johnson
was ordered to be implanted with Norplant after the delivery of her
baby. 157 During the sentencing hearing, the judge inquired if
Johnson was currently on welfare or planned to be on welfare, to
148 Rachel Stephanie Arnow, The Implantation of Rights: An Argument for Uncondition-
ally Funded Norplant Removal 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 19 (1996).
149 Id. at 19.
150 Id. at 21.
151 Vance, supra note 124, at 829.
152 Vance, supra note 124, at 830.
153 Vance, supra note 124, at 831.
154 Spitz, supra note 93, at 143, n.72 (citing Mark A. Stein,Judge to Let Birth Control
Order Stand, LA. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1991, at A3).
155 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
156 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
157 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144.
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which she answered yes.158 Then, stating a concern for her chil-
dren and her parenting ability, the judge asked if she would be
willing to be implanted with a new birth control, similar to the pill,
which lasted five years and had recently been approved by the
FDA.'59 Johnson agreed without having been informed of the side
effects for her particular conditions-high blood pressure, diabe-
tes, and a heart murmur-which excluded her from its use.16 °
Within the week, her attorney, who had not been at the proba-
tion hearing, asked the court to set aside the terms of the proba-
tion in view of Johnson's medical unsuitability for Norplant
treatment, her constitutional right to privacy, and the statutory ar-
gument that Norplant was unrelated to her rehabilitation. 6' The
judge refused, stating that "[i]t is in the defendant's best interest
and certainly in any unconceived child's interest that she not have
any more children until she is mentally and emotionally prepared
to do So."162
The case was appealed but became a moot issue when Johnson
violated the terms of her parole to not use drugs, and was sen-
tenced to a prison term.163 The appeals court subsequently re-
fused to address the constitutionality of using Norplant as a
condition of parole."6
Johnson is not, however, the only woman for whom Norplant
has been used as a condition of parole. In Nebraska, twenty-one
year old Michelle Carlton agreed to use Norplant as part of her
plea agreement.165 In Texas, nineteen year old Ida Jean Tovar, an
unmarried mother of three, agreed to the use of Norplant in her
plea agreement. 166  Again in Texas, Cathy Lanel Knighten, a
twenty-three year old poor woman charged with smothering her
infant, agreed to a Norplant implantation as part of a plea
agreement.16
7
Like the forced sterilization of women, which has tended to
result in the misuse and abuse of African-American, Latina, and
158 Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
159 Michael Lev, Judge is Firm on Forced Contraception, but Welcomes an Appeal N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1991, at A17; Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
160 Lev, supra note 159, at A17.
161 Spitz, supra note 93, at 146; Stein, supra note 154, at A3.
162 Lev, supra note 159, at A17; Spitz, supra note 93, at 146.
163 Spitz, supra note 93, at 147 n.91.
164 Spitz, supra note 93, at 147 n.91; People v. Johnson, No. F015316, 1992 WL
685375, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1992).
165 Spitz, supa note 93, at 144 n.78.
166 Spitz, supra note 93, at 144 n.78.
167 Spitz, supra note 93, at 145 n.78.
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poor women's reproductive autonomy, the use of Norplant has
also been used to control the reproductive autonomy of women.
Note Jeanne Vance's assessment of this situation:
[T] he public perception is that welfare mothers are unmarried
and non-white. Therefore, the Norplant bills may draw support
from prejudice and racial stereotyping. Certainly racism pro-
vides a partial motivation, even if only on a subconscious level,
for some politicians and medical professionals who seek to pre-
vent women of color from reproducing.1 68
C. Fetal Abuse Laws
As of 1996, "two hundred women in thirty-five states had been
charged with abusing an unborn child."' 6 9 Fetal abuse laws have
also been employed to selectively control women's reproductive au-
tonomy. The use of fetal abuse laws-in addition to the fact that
they place the interests of the embryo higher than that of the
mother-has been shown to place a higher burden on African-
American and poor women than on white or middle-class wo-
men. 170 One study noted that although there were equal rates of
drug use among African-American and white women at one clinic,
African-American women were nearly ten times more likely than
white women to be reported to state agencies for drug abuse.1 7 1
This same study also noted that poor women were more likely than
middle class women to be reported to the authorities.1 7 2 In Pinel-
las County, Florida, a study comparing the tests of pregnant wo-
men receiving care from either public or private clinics found that
60% of the 133 women reported to health authorities had incomes
less than $12,000, while only 8% of those reported had incomes of
$25,000 or more a year.173 It has been suggested that one reason
for this disparity is that doctors, in this case white and middle-/
upper-class, identified more readily with someone from their own
168 Vance, supra note 124, at 832-33 (citation omitted).
169 Murphy, supra note 141, at 713. Prosecution for fetal abuse has usually taken
two forms: prosecution under drug trafficking laws, or prosecution under criminal
child abuse and neglect statutes. The successful prosecution under drug trafficking
laws has been overturned on the grounds that these statutes prohibit trafficking to
"born persons." Prosecution under criminal child abuse and neglect statutes has cre-
ated litigation over whether a fetus is to be considered a child for the purposes of the
statute. Murphy, supra note 141, at 713-14.
170 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36.
171 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing IraJ. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of
Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in
Pinellas County, Florida, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (1990)).
172 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing Chasnoff, supra note 171, at 1205).
173 Oberman, supra note 71, at 9 n.36 (citing Chasnoff, supra note 171, at 1205).
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socio-economic background, and were thus less likely to report sus-
pected abuse by white or middle-class women to authorities than
for African-American or poor women.
Note the experience of twenty-three year old Jennifer Clarise
Johnson, the first woman convicted of exposing her baby to drugs
while pregnant, 174 as an example of this phenomenon. Johnson
was prosecuted with two counts of delivering a controlled sub-
stance to a minor. The delivery supposedly occurred in the sixty
seconds after birth and before the umbilical cord was cut. 75 The
conviction was upheld by the appeals court, marking the first time
a law prohibiting distribution of drugs to children under eighteen
was successfully used as a fetal protection law and upheld by a state
appeals court.1
76
The Johnson case, however, is not an isolated incident. Hoff-
man reports that between 1987 and 1991 at least fifty "fetal abuse"
cases were brought in nineteen states and the District of Colum-
bia.1 77 But as one study reported, of fifty-two defendants in fetal
abuse law cases, thirty-five were African-American, two were Latina,
and one was Native American. Only fourteen of the woman were
white.' 78 Also note a 1990 The New York Times report stating that of
sixty women charged with fetal abuse, 80% were minorities. 179 In
Florida, as of 1991, ten of the eleven criminal cases for fetal abuse
were brought against African-American women. Further, in South
Carolina from 1989 to 1991, seventeen of the eighteen women
charged with criminal neglect or distributing drugs to a minor
were African-American. 180 These statistics suggest that fetal abuse
laws are also being used to negatively control minority and poor
women's reproductive autonomy.
174 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420.
175 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420. There are many exam-
ples of prosecution under fetal abuse laws. See generally Roberts, Punishing Drug Ad-
dicts, supra note 113, at 1420 n.2.
176 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1420 n.2 (citing Tamar Lewin,
Court in Florida Upholds Conviction for Drug Delivery by Umbilical Cord, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 1991, at 6).
177 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.5 (citingJan Hoffman,
Pregnant Addicted-and Guilty?, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug. 19, 1990, at 32, 35).
178 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6 (referring to a mem-
orandum of the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project).
179 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6 (citing Gina Kolata,
Bias Seen Against Pregnant Addicts, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A13).
180 Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts, supra note 113, at 1421 n.6.
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VI. FINDING REPRODUCTIVE AUTONOMY
There are many layers from which to analyze gender inequal-
ity within reproductive technologies. One is by viewing the bias
within the technology itself. With IVF the inequality results from
women being placed in competition with the technology, doctors,
and views of informed consent. Inequality can also become appar-
ent from viewing those who do not use IVF and how those women
have their reproductive autonomy controlled outside IVF use. All
women experience domination through the loss of their reproduc-
tive autonomy. From this common domination, it is possible to
move the discussion to fighting and ending the domination rather
than simply focusing on the differences within the experience of
domination.
This Note has attempted to demonstrate that IVF has the po-
tential to be used to control women's reproductive autonomy both
as an individual technology and as part of a larger pattern of con-
trol. When one views IVF as part of a system of gender control, it
becomes easy to see the systematic domination of women through
restrictions on all women's reproductive autonomy whether it is in
preventing or promoting their fertility.
Only by recognizing the limits that reproductive technologies
place on women can women gain control over the technology and
begin the quest to define their own reproductive autonomy.
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